Trouble on the High Seas: A Need for Change in the Wake of \u3cem\u3eAustralia v. Japan\u3c/em\u3e by DiCenso, Matt
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 39
Issue 3 Electronic Supplement Article 3
5-18-2016
Trouble on the High Seas: A Need for Change in
the Wake of Australia v. Japan
Matt DiCenso
Boston College Law School, matthew.dicenso@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Animal Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, International Law Commons,
and the International Trade Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matt DiCenso, Trouble on the High Seas: A Need for Change in the Wake of Australia v. Japan, 39 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. E. Supp. 13
(2016),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol39/iss3/3
  
13 
TROUBLE ON THE HIGH SEAS: A NEED 
FOR CHANGE IN THE WAKE OF 
AUSTRALIA v. JAPAN 
MATT DICENSO* 
Abstract: On March 31, 2014, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held 
that Japan’s whaling program, known as JARPA II, lacked scientific merit and 
thus violated three provisions of the Schedule to the International Convention 
for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). This victory for whale conservation-
ists was short-lived, however, as Japan, ignoring procedural safeguards put in 
place by the International Whaling Commission (IWC), soon announced its 
plan to launch a new whaling program in conformity with both the ICJ’s deci-
sion and the ICRW. Japan’s course of action highlights not only the limited 
applicability of the ICJ’s judgment, but also the inability of the IWC to effec-
tively regulate Contracting Governments. 
INTRODUCTION 
Look sharp, all of ye! There are whales hereabouts! If ye see a white 
one, split your lungs for him!  
—Moby Dick1 
Since the days of Herman Melville’s whaling adventures—which pro-
vided the inspiration for his literary masterpiece, Moby Dick—the practice 
of whaling has evolved into a contentious international environmental is-
sue.2 In order to “provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and 
thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry,” the 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) was signed 
in 1946. 3 The ICRW established the International Whaling Commission 
(IWC), an inter-governmental body that is tasked with collectively deciding 
                                                                                                                           
 * Matt DiCenso is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
 1 HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 115 (Tony Tanner ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1988). 
 2 See generally Mark Derr, To Whale or Not to Whale, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1997, http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/10/to-whale-or-not-to-whale/376971/ [https://perma.cc/
XNG3-Q3HH] (discussing the continuing international debate over the risk of whale extinction and 
which, if any, whales can be hunted). 
 3 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling pmbl., Dec. 2, 1946, 63 Stat. 1716, 
161 U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter ICRW]. 
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how to regulate the whaling industry and promote whale conservation.4 
Although a moratorium on commercial whaling has been in place since 
1986, the government of Japan has continued to practice special-permit 
whaling in accordance with Article VIII of the ICRW.5 A special permit 
under Article VIII allows member countries to kill whales for scientific re-
search purposes and places regulatory power in the hands of individual 
governments rather than the IWC.6 Japan’s special-permit program—known 
as JARPA II—was the subject of a suit filed by Australia in 2010, charging 
Japan with disguising a commercial whaling venture in the Antarctic as a 
scientific research program.7 On March 31, 2014, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) ruled against Japan in Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Inter-
vening, finding that Japan’s whaling program lacked scientific merit and 
thus violated three provisions of the Schedule to the ICRW.8 As a result of 
the judgment, Japan was required to formally discontinue its JARPA II pro-
gram.9 
Although the outcome in Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening 
is undoubtedly a win for the whales, the judgment itself may accomplish 
little more than ending one Japanese whaling program to make room for 
another.10 In November 2014, Japan announced its proposed research plan 
for a new scientific whaling program, NEWREP-A, to launch in 2015.11 
Part I of this Comment provides background on the facts of Australia 
v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening, as well as pertinent portions of the 
ICRW. Part I also outlines the procedural history of the proceedings before 
the ICJ. Part II highlights each party’s arguments and the ICJ’s analysis. 
Part III analyzes this judgment in light of Japan’s new proposed research 
program and discusses the case’s implications on the interpretation and ap-
                                                                                                                           
 4 See id. art. III, ¶ 1. 
 5 See id. art. VIII; International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Schedule, § III, 
¶ 10(e), Dec. 2, 1946, 63 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter Schedule]. 
 6 See ICRW, supra note 3, art. VIII. 
 7 See Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening), Judgment, 
2014 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 48 (Mar. 31) [hereinafter Judgment]. 
 8 See id. ¶¶ 228, 244. The ICJ found that Japan’s program violated the following provisions of 
the Schedule: “the obligation to respect zero catch limits for the killing for commercial purposes 
of whales from all stocks (para. 10 (e)); the factory ship moratorium (para. 10 (d)); and the prohi-
bition on commercial whaling in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary (para. 7 (b)).” Id. ¶ 228. 
 9 See id. ¶ 245. 
 10 See generally JAPAN MINISTRY OF AGRIC., FORESTRY & FISHERIES, PROPOSED RESEARCH 
PLAN FOR NEW SCIENTIFIC WHALE RESEARCH PROGRAM IN THE ANTARCTIC OCEAN (NEWREP-
A), http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/j/whale/pdf/newrep--a.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD47-B63V] [hereinaf-
ter NEWREP-A] (outlining, among other things, the research methods and objectives of Japan’s 
proposed whaling program). 
 11 See Japan Plans Unilateral Restart to Antarctic Whaling in 2015, Says Official, GUARDIAN 
(June 20, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/20/japan-plans-unilateral-restart-
to-antarctic-whaling-in-2015-says-official [https://perma.cc/57DX-EYTR]. 
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plication of Article VIII of the ICRW. Part III also urges the IWC to main-
tain greater oversight over the issuance of special permits and adopt proce-
dures to address member noncompliance. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On May 31, 2010, Australia filed an application instituting proceedings 
against Japan before the ICJ.12 At the center of the suit was JARPA II, Ja-
pan’s special-permit scientific whaling program, which launched in 2005.13 
JARPA II is the successor to JARPA, Japan’s first research program in the 
Antarctic introduced during the 1987–88 whaling season.14 As scientific 
whaling programs, both JARPA and JARPA II were regulated under Article 
VIII of the ICRW.15 In its pertinent part, Article VIII provides that “any 
Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit 
authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scien-
tific research.”16 These special permits may be issued notwithstanding the 
ICRW’s contents.17 Contracting Governments are given a fair amount of 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan), Application Instituting Proceedings, (May 
31, 2010), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/15951.pdf [https://perma.cc/54HB-KQEY]. 
 13 See Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening), Judgment, 
2014 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 48 (Mar. 31) [hereinafter Judgment]. 
 14 See id. ¶ 100. 
 15 See ICRW, supra note 3, art. VIII. Article VIII of the ICRW states: 
 1. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention any Contracting Gov-
ernment may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national 
to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research subject to such re-
strictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Gov-
ernment thinks fit, and the killing, taking, and treating of whales in accordance with 
the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation of this Convention. 
Each Contracting Government shall report at once to the Commission all such au-
thorizations which it has granted. Each Contracting Government may at any time re-
voke any such special permit which it has granted.  
 2. Any whales taken under these special permits shall so far as practicable be 
processed and the proceeds shall be dealt with in accordance with directions issued 
by the Government by which the permit was granted.  
 3. Each Contracting Government shall transmit to such body as may be designat-
ed by the Commission, in so far as practicable, and at intervals of not more than one 
year, scientific information available to that Government with respect to whales and 
whaling, including the results of research conducted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this 
Article and to Article IV.  
 4. Recognizing that continuous collection and analysis of biological data in con-
nection with the operations of factory ships and land stations are indispensable to 
sound and constructive management of the whale fisheries, the Contracting Gov-
ernments will take all practicable measures to obtain such data. 
Id. 
 16 Id. ¶ 1. 
 17 See id. 
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discretion in crafting these programs because the research is “subject to 
such restrictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as the 
Contracting Government thinks fit.”18 Article VIII simply requires Contract-
ing Governments to submit collected scientific information and data to the 
IWC “in so far as practicable, and at intervals of not more than one year.”19 
In March 2005, Japan submitted to the IWC Scientific Committee its 
plan for JARPA II.20 Japan’s research plan identified four research objec-
tives: “(1) Monitoring of the Antarctic ecosystem; (2) Modelling competi-
tion among whale species and future management objectives; (3) Elucida-
tion of temporal and spatial changes in stock structure; and (4) Improving 
the management procedure for Antarctic minke whale stocks.” 21  The 
JARPA II program operated in an area located within the Southern Ocean 
Sanctuary, a region where all commercial whaling was banned in 1994.22 In 
an even more controversial move, Japan chose to utilize both lethal and 
non-lethal methods to pursue its research objectives.23 Specifically, the re-
search plan for JARPA II provided for an annual catch of 50 fin and hump-
back whales and 850 Antarctic minke whales—over double the numbers of 
its predecessor JARPA, which resulted in the killing of more than 6700 
minke whales in the span of 18 years.24 The case before the ICJ, brought by 
Australia and joined by New Zealand as an intervener, centered on allega-
tions that JARPA II did not fall within the Article VIII exception for scien-
tific research.25 As a result, Australia and New Zealand argued that Japan 
had breached obligations established by the Schedule to the ICRW.26 The 
Schedule is an integral part of the ICRW which—among other things—
establishes legally binding catch limits for both commercial and aboriginal 
whaling.27 The provisions of the Schedule can be amended by the IWC.28 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. ¶ 3. 
 20 See Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. ¶ 109. 
 21 Id. ¶ 113. 
 22 See Schedule, supra note 5, ¶ 7(b); ‘Business as Usual’ as Japan Publishes New ‘Research 
Whaling’ Plan, WHALE & DOLPHIN CONSERVATION (Nov. 18, 2014, 10:48 AM), http://us.whales.
org/news/2014/11/business-usual-japan-publishes-new-research-whalingplan [https://perma.cc/Z288-
SN8W]. 
 23 See Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. ¶ 121. 
 24 See id. ¶¶ 104, 123. 
 25 See id. ¶ 48; Press Release, I.C.J., Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan): The Court 
Authorizes New Zealand to Intervene in the Proceedings, I.C.J. Press Release No. 2013/2 (Feb. 
13, 2013). Article VIII of the ICRW authorizes member countries to engage in the killing, taking, 
and treating of whales for purposes of scientific research, but it does not explicitly define scientific 
research. ICRW, supra note 3, art. VIII. 
 26 See Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. ¶ 48. 
 27 See ICRW, supra note 3, art. I, ¶ 1; Schedule, supra note 5, § III, ¶ 10(e). 
 28 See ICRW, supra note 3, art. V, ¶ 1. 
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Notable provisions of the Schedule include the establishment of the South-
ern Ocean Sanctuary29 and the 1986 moratorium on commercial whaling.30 
Japan’s most recent proposal for scientific whaling, NEWREP-A, fo-
cuses on minke whales and sets its sample size at 333 whales annually over 
a 12-year period.31 Due to the program’s similarity to its predecessors—the 
proposed research plan involves lethal sampling of whales and would once 
again implicate the Southern Ocean Sanctuary—opponents are referring to 
it as JARPA III.32 
II. DISCUSSION 
The ICJ established jurisdiction over this dispute based on each party’s 
declaration of acceptance under Article 36, Paragraph 2 of the ICJ’s stat-
ute.33 In broad terms, Australia claimed that Japan’s JARPA II program did 
not fall within the meaning of scientific research permitted by Article 
VIII.34 It followed that Japan had breached and continued to breach its obli-
gations under the Schedule to the ICRW, specifically: 
(1) the obligation to respect the moratorium setting zero catch 
limits for the killing of whales from all stocks for commercial 
purposes; (2) the obligation not to undertake commercial whaling 
of fin whales in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary; and (3) the obli-
gation to observe the moratorium on the taking, killing or treating 
of whales, except minke whales, by factory ships or whale catch-
ers attached to factory ships.35 
Japan contested all of Australia’s allegations, contending that JARPA II 
was indeed a program undertaken for scientific research and, therefore, was 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Schedule, supra note 5, ¶ 7(b). Established in 1994, the Southern Ocean Sanctuary is 
an area where all commercial whaling is banned. See id. The Sanctuary comprises the waters of 
the Southern Hemisphere southwards of the following line: starting from 40 degrees S, 50 degrees 
W; thence due east to 20 degrees E; thence due south to 55 degrees S; thence due east to 130 de-
grees E; thence due north to 40 degrees S; thence due east to 130 degrees W; thence due south to 
60 degrees S; thence due east to 50 degrees W; thence due north to the point of beginning. Id.  
 30 See id. ¶ 10(e). In 1982, the IWC set the catch limit for commercial whaling at zero, effec-
tively banning the practice. See INT’L WHALING COMM’N, Commercial Whaling (2016), https://
iwc.int/commercial [https://perma.cc/F9AF-MNEG]. Still in effect today, the moratorium applied 
to the 1985–86 season and onwards. See id. 
 31 See NEWREP-A, supra note 10, at 10, 30. 
 32  See INT’L FUND FOR ANIMAL WELFARE, JAPAN’S “NEW” PROPOSAL FOR CONTINUED 
RESEARCH WHALING IN THE ANTARCTIC OCEAN (2014), http://www.ifaw.org/sites/default/files/
2015-Greenpeace-IFAW-WWF-JARPA-III-Briefing.pdf [https://perma.cc/AC6Z-7KAH]. 
 33 See Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening), Judgment, 
2014 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 31 (Mar. 31) [hereinafter Judgment]. 
 34 See id. ¶ 48. 
 35 Id. 
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exempted from the obligations invoked by Australia.36 As intervener, New 
Zealand argued that JARPA II was not designed for scientific purposes and, 
thus, was not exempted from the obligations set out in the Schedule of the 
ICRW.37 
Because each party’s claims dealt extensively with scientific evidence, 
the ICJ employed a scheduled process for the presentation and subsequent 
review of such evidence.38 The ICJ’s development of a schedule for present-
ing expert witnesses and their testimonies—both to opposing parties and to 
the ICJ itself—proved to be a welcome departure from past dealings with 
technical scientific evidence. 39  Jacqueline Peel, Professor of Law at the 
Melbourne Law School in Australia and current co-chair of the American 
Society of International Law’s International Environmental Law Interest 
Group, praised the ICJ’s “streamlined process,” as one that “demonstrates 
that the ICJ can be an effective and efficient forum for the resolution of con-
tested law/science matters.”40 
For the ICJ, the central issue in Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Inter-
vening was the interpretation and application of Article VIII of the ICRW.41 
As an “integral part of the Convention,” the ICJ determined that Article VIII 
had to be interpreted with the object and purpose of the ICRW in mind.42 
Taking into account the preamble of the ICRW, which highlights objectives 
of the treaty ranging from conservation to sustainable exploitation of whale 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See id. ¶ 49. 
 37 See Cymie R. Payne, Australia v. Japan: ICJ Halts Antarctic Whaling, AM. SOC’Y OF 
INT’L LAW (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/9/australia-v-japan-icj-
halts-antarctic-whaling [https://perma.cc/T358-T6E3]. 
 38 See Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. ¶¶ 14–22. 
 39 See Jacqueline Peel, Introductory Note to Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: 
New Zealand Intervening) (I.C.J.), 54 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW 1, 1 (Mar. 31, 2014). As Profes-
sor Peel notes, “Past environmental decisions of the ICJ have been criticized for the Court’s ap-
parent discomfort and lack of competence in dealing with the technical scientific evidence that is a 
common feature of international environmental disputes.” Id. at 1. Specifically, the ICJ was wide-
ly criticized for its poor handling of scientific evidence in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Ar-
gentina v. Uruguay) in 2010. See Payne, supra note 37. 
 40 See Payne, supra note 37. 
 41 See 2014 I.C.J. ¶ 50. Article VIII, Section 1 of the ICRW states, 
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention any Contracting Govern-
ment may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national to 
kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research subject to such re-
strictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Gov-
ernment thinks fit, and the killing, taking, and treating of whales in accordance with 
the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation of this Convention. 
Each Contracting Government shall report at once to the Commission all such au-
thorizations which it has granted. Each Contracting Government may at any time re-
voke any such special permit which it has granted. 
ICRW, supra note 3, art. VIII. 
 42 Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. ¶ 55. 
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stocks, the ICJ determined that neither “a restrictive nor an expansive inter-
pretation of Article VIII is justified.”43 As the definition of “scientific re-
search” had not been adequately settled before this case, the ICJ determined 
“foster[ing] scientific knowledge” to be the crucial component of an Article 
VIII scientific program, leaving room for programs that pursue goals other 
than those laid out in the ICRW’s preamble.44 According to Professor Peel, 
the ICJ’s approach “effectively severed the dispute over Article VIII from 
the contested values surrounding whaling, focusing instead on the scientific 
merit of Japan’s program.”45 
Before analyzing the scientific merit of JARPA II, however, the ICJ 
addressed the issuance of permits for scientific programs.46 It rejected Ja-
pan’s argument that the nationality of the entity requesting the permit 
should be given full discretion in granting such permits.47 Instead, the ICJ 
developed a two-tiered standard of review to assess the reasonableness of a 
country’s authorization for special-permit programs.48 Specifically, the ICJ 
focused on the “meaning of the terms ‘scientific research’ and ‘for purposes 
of’ in the [Article VIII] phrase ‘for purposes of scientific research.’”49 The 
ICJ found the two elements of the phrase to be cumulative.50 “As a result, 
even if a whaling programme involves scientific research, the killing, taking 
and treating of whales pursuant to such a programme does not fall within 
Article VIII unless these activities are ‘for purposes of’ scientific re-
search.”51 Applying this objective standard, the ICJ found that JARPA II’s 
lethal sampling of whales could “broadly be characterized as ‘scientific re-
search,’” but declined to explicitly define the term.52 
The second prong of the ICJ’s standard of review—the “for purposes 
of” inquiry—assesses whether “the programme’s design and implementa-
tion are reasonable in relation to achieving its stated objectives.”53 Japan 
contended that JARPA II’s lethal sampling of whales was reasonable in rela-
tion to two of the program’s research objectives in particular: monitoring of 
the Antarctic ecosystem and modeling competition among whale species.54 
Although the ICJ determined that “the use of lethal sampling per se is not 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Id. ¶ 58. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Peel, supra note 39, at 2. 
 46 See Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. ¶ 59. 
 47 See id. ¶ 61. 
 48 See id. ¶ 67. 
 49 See id. ¶ 70. 
 50 See id. ¶ 71. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See id. ¶ 127. 
 53 Id. ¶ 67. 
 54 See id. ¶ 224. 
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unreasonable in relation to the research objectives of JARPA II[,]” it found 
that the target sample sizes of the program were unreasonable when com-
pared to its stated objectives.55 Specifically, the ICJ based this determina-
tion on JARPA II’s scale of lethal sampling compared to that of its prede-
cessor JARPA.56 Because the objectives of the two programs overlapped 
considerably, the ICJ was not convinced that the small differences between 
JARPA and JARPA II warranted such an extensive increase in the scale of 
lethal sampling—JARPA II called for much more extensive sampling of 
Antarctic minke whales as well as lethal sampling of two other whale spe-
cies.57 Consequently, the ICJ ordered Japan to revoke authorization to kill, 
take, or treat whales in relation to JARPA II.58 Furthermore, the ICJ stated 
that it expected Japan to take account of this judgment when contemplating 
the granting of future permits under Article VIII.59 
III. ANALYSIS 
The most significant issue that arises from the holding in Australia v. 
Japan: New Zealand Intervening may be the final substantive sentence of 
the opinion: “It is to be expected that Japan will take account of the reason-
ing and conclusions contained in this Judgment as it evaluates the possibil-
ity of granting any future permits under Article VIII, paragraph 1, of the 
Convention.”60 
A. Fool Me Once, Shame on You; Fool Me Twice, Shame on Me 
The ICJ’s ruling did not put an end to special-permit whaling, or scien-
tific whaling in general.61 Rather, the decision had a binding effect on one 
specific program: JARPA II.62 Although the ICJ found that JARPA II could 
not pass muster under Article VIII, it left the door open for the establish-
ment of scientific programs that did conform to its standards.63 In other 
words, the ICJ exposed the IWC to the possibility of being fooled again.64 If 
restructured to meet the ICJ’s criteria, another Japanese scientific program 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See id. 
 56 See id. ¶¶ 224–225. 
 57 See id. 
 58 See id. ¶ 245. 
 59 See id. ¶ 246. 
 60 See Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening), Judgment, 
2014 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 246 (Mar. 31) [hereinafter Judgment]. 
 61 See id. ¶ 245; see, e.g., NEWREP-A, supra note 10. 
 62 See Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. ¶ 245. 
 63 See id.; see, e.g., NEWREP-A, supra note 10. 
 64 See Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. ¶ 245; see, e.g., NEWREP-A, supra note 10. 
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could potentially fit into the Article VIII exception.65 Wasting little time, 
Japan appears to have done just that by releasing plans to launch another 
scientific whaling program, NEWREP-A, in late 2015.66 Although Japan 
has insisted that this new program conforms to the ICJ’s ruling and fits 
within the Article VIII scientific whaling exception, opponents have criti-
cized it as yet another commercial whaling venture in disguise.67 
To its credit, after the decision in Australia v. Japan: New Zealand In-
tervening and before Japan’s release of plans for NEWREP-A, the IWC 
took steps to improve its special-permit review process by adopting Resolu-
tion 2014-5 at its 65th meeting in September 2014.68 The Resolution recog-
nized the ICJ’s findings and stated that the ICJ’s reasoning should inform 
decisions relating to the granting and evaluation of special permits by par-
ties to the ICRW.69 Resolution 2014-5 affirmed the authority of the Scien-
tific Committee of the IWC to “review and comment on proposed special 
permits” and for the IWC itself to “receive and consider the reports and 
recommendations of the Scientific Committee and make such recommenda-
tions as it sees fit.”70 Furthermore, the Resolution instructed the Scientific 
Committee to revise how it reviews special-permit research programs, call-
ing for adoption of the ICJ’s reasonableness language.71 Lastly, the Resolu-
tion requested that no further special permits for the taking of whales are to 
be issued until: 
 (a) the Scientific Committee has reviewed the research pro-
gramme to enable it to provide advice to the Commission . . .  
 (b) the Commission has considered the report of the Scientific 
Committee and assessed whether the proponent of the special 
permit programme has acted in accordance with the review pro-
cess . . . ; and  
 (c) the Commission has, in accordance with Article VI, made 
such recommendations on the merits or otherwise of the special 
permit as it sees fit.72 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. ¶ 245; see, e.g., NEWREP-A, supra note 10. 
 66 See NEWREP-A, supra note 10; Japan Plans Unilateral Restart to Antarctic Whaling in 
2015, Says Official, supra note 11. 
 67 See ‘Business as Usual’ as Japan Publishes New ‘Research Whaling’ Plan, supra note 22. 
 68 See Int’l Whaling Comm’n [IWC], Res. 2014-5, pmbl., Resolution on Whaling Under Special 
Permit (2014), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3723&search=%21collection72&order_by
=relevance&sort=DESC&offset=0&archive=0&k=&curpos=0 [https://perma.cc/2JXD-UTWW]. 
 69 See id. 
 70 See id. 
 71 See id. ¶ 1(a). 
 72 Id. ¶ 3. 
22 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 39:E. Supp. 
B. A Disturbing Trend 
Overall, the effect of Resolution 2014-5 on the IWC’s special-permit 
review process is minimal: it did little more than reaffirm a procedural 
framework that has proven to be ineffective in the past.73 Moreover, as Don-
ald K. Anton, Corresponding Editor of International Legal Materials and 
member of the American Society of International Law, points out, IWC reso-
lutions—especially those addressing Japanese special-permit programs—
have historically been disregarded.74 A 2003 IWC resolution calling for Ja-
pan to put an end to JARPA, its first special-permit program established in 
1987, was overlooked.75 Resolutions in 2005 and 2007 that cast doubt on 
the scientific purposes of JARPA II fared no better.76 Whether the resolu-
tions “strongly urged” or “called upon” Japan to suspend its special-permit 
programs, the IWC’s recommendations remained unheeded with Japan opt-
ing instead to continue its whaling programs.77 
Japan’s lack of compliance with IWC Resolutions is indicative of a 
disturbing trend—one that in all likelihood will continue with NEWREP-
A.78 In its most recent report published in June 2015, the Scientific Com-
mittee of the IWC stated that it was unable to determine whether lethal 
sampling was justified for the management and conservation of whale 
stock.79 This lack of consensus largely stemmed from the report of an IWC 
expert panel.80 Comprised of five current members of the Scientific Com-
mittee, three independent scientists, one scientist who rarely participates in 
the Committee, and the Head of Science, the panel was tasked with provid-
ing an “objective scientific review of the NEWREP-A proposal.”81 Overall, 
the panel found that “it was not able to determine whether lethal sampling is 
necessary to achieve the [program’s] two major objectives,” mainly because 
“the proposal contained insufficient information for the panel to complete a 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See Donald K. Anton, Dispute Concerning Japan’s JARPA II Program of “Scientific Whaling” 
(Australia v. Japan), AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW (July 8, 2010), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/14/
issue/20/dispute-concerning-japan%E2%80%99s-jarpa-ii-program-%E2%80%9Cscientific-whaling%
E2%80%9D [https://perma.cc/C585-6AU9]. 
 74 See id. 
 75 See id. 
 76 See id. 
 77 See id. 
 78 See id.; Experts Slam Japan’s New Whaling Plan: No More Whales Need to Be Killed, 
INT’L FUND FOR ANIMAL WELFARE (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.ifaw.org/africa/news/experts-
slam-japan’s-new-whaling-plan-no-more-whales-need-be-killed [https://perma.cc/BQC8-CUV2]. 
 79 See Int’l Whaling Comm’n, Rep. of the Scientific Committee, IWC/66/Rep01(2015), 89 (June 
19, 2015), https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=5429&search=%21collection73&order_by=relevance
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full review.”82 Therefore, the panel “concluded that the current proposal did 
not demonstrate the need for lethal sampling.”83 
Whale conservationists pegged the panel’s report as a major blow to 
Japan’s attempt to restart its whaling program.84 The Global Whale Program 
Director for the International Fund for Animal Welfare, Patrick Ramage, 
noted: 
It’s 2015. You don’t need to be a scientific expert to know there’s 
no need to slaughter whales in the Southern Ocean. We urge Ja-
pan to continue the non-lethal research work it embarked on this 
year, and to present the results of that modern approach to the 
IWC when it meets in September 2016.85 
In response to the Scientific Committee’s report, Japanese officials said they 
would submit additional data, but intended to resume whaling for the 2015 
season.86 “We have not changed any policies and our goal,” said Joji Mor-
ishita, Japan’s representative to the IWC and IWC Vice-Chair.87 
As Virginia Morell, contributor to the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, noted, Japan does not necessarily need approval 
from the expert panel, or from the Scientific Committee, to continue with 
NEWREP-A.88 Article VIII of the ICRW gives the individual country the 
power to oversee scientific whaling programs.89 Additionally, Paragraph 30 
of the Schedule to the ICRW merely gives the Scientific Committee the 
powers of “review and comment” with regard to the process by which  par-
ties submit proposed special permits.90 All things considered, it appears the 
IWC is all bark and no bite, and Japan has caught on.91 Andrew Brierley, a 
marine ecologist at the University of St. Andrews and member of the IWC’s 
expert panel, said that other panelists warned him at the beginning of the 
process that Japanese whaling was “inevitable” and that “their review was a 
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waste of time.”92 “We were made unwilling collaborators in a process that’s 
moving toward approval,” Brierley said of the panelists. 93 
Considering Japan has stated that it plans to resume whaling in the 
Antarctic in the coming winter season, the warnings of Brierley’s col-
leagues appear to hold weight.94 Although Japan may not necessarily need 
approval from the Scientific Committee to proceed with NEWREP-A, it is 
required to follow IWC procedure before launching a special-permit pro-
gram.95 Japan’s unilateral restart to scientific whaling in 2015 would be in 
direct violation of the procedural framework for review of special-permit 
programs established by Resolution 2014-5.96 As mentioned above, Resolu-
tion 2014-5 called for member countries to suspend the issuance of special 
permits until, inter alia, the IWC can consider the report of the Scientific 
Committee and make recommendations on the merits or otherwise of the 
special permit.97 With NEWREP-A set to launch this year and the IWC not 
meeting fully until 2016, Japan will effectively bypass the review process.98 
C. A Need for Change 
Japan’s latest dismissal of an IWC Resolution reveals a need for 
change.99 Currently, Article VI of the ICRW states, “The Commission may 
from time to time make recommendations to any or all Contracting Gov-
ernments on any matters which relate to whales or whaling and to the objec-
tives and purposes of this Convention.”100 This, combined with the Scien-
tific Committee’s “review and comment” power under Paragraph 30 of the 
Schedule, is the only arrow in the IWC’s quiver.101 If the only weapons at 
the IWC’s disposal continue to be recommendations, reviews, and com-
ments, Japan will undoubtedly continue to take advantage of the Article 
VIII scientific whaling exception.102 
The ICJ addressed the need for greater IWC oversight by stating, 
“[W]hether the killing, taking and treating of whales pursuant to a requested 
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special permit is for purposes of scientific research cannot depend simply 
on that State’s perception.”103 What that oversight should look like is up for 
debate.104 One solution could be to amend the Schedule to the ICRW to give 
Scientific Committee Reports and IWC Resolutions more teeth. 105  This 
would mean that, in the very least, steps need to be taken so that Contract-
ing Parties cannot blatantly ignore the IWC review process.106 Judge ad hoc 
Hilary Charlesworth, in a separate opinion to Australia v. Japan: New Zea-
land Intervening, emphasized the duty of cooperation, an element critical to 
“the fabric of the ICRW.”107 Judge Charlesworth opined that despite the 
legally nonbinding nature of the Scientific Committee’s views on special-
permit proposals, the IWC has empowered the Committee to review and 
comment on proposals, “thereby creating an obligation on the proposing 
State to co-operate with the Committee.”108 
Although Judge Charlesworth states that the lack of such an obligation 
would “deprive paragraph 30 [of the Schedule] of any effect,” Japan’s 
course of action with NEWREP-A demonstrates that parties can abandon 
this obligation with little, if any, consequence.109 One solution could be 
placing increased emphasis on this “duty of co-operation” by amending the 
ICRW to elevate this “duty” to a binding legal obligation, including penal-
ties for noncompliance.110 After all, the concept of a duty to cooperate “is 
the foundation of legal regimes dealing (inter alia) with shared resources 
and with the environment.”111 If a change in the binding nature of the duty 
to cooperate, Scientific Committee Reports, or IWC Resolutions is not at-
tainable, the IWC could—at the very least—develop a formal procedure to 
deal with noncompliance.112 
In 2010, the Chair and Vice-Chair of the IWC proposed the establish-
ment of a Management and Compliance Committee that would—among 
other things—report parties’ compliance with agreed upon procedures to the 
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IWC and recommend action in response to any violations to the ICRW.113 
The Committee, however, was never created because a consensus decision 
was not reached.114 In her paper Revising the International Convention on 
the Regulation of Whaling: A Proposal to End the Stalemate Within the In-
ternational Whaling Commission, Tara Jordan urged the IWC to follow 
through with the creation of the Committee.115 Jordan argues that the Com-
mittee would increase accountability of member countries and “provide the 
IWC with teeth to make it a more effective body as members would be 
compelled to conform to IWC regulations, and would face consequences for 
any failure to do so.”116 Additionally, a formal procedure to address non-
compliance with real consequences for violating members would give the 
IWC more bite. 117  Consequences for noncompliance could range from 
monetary sanctions and probationary periods to ineligibility for IWC funds 
and loss of voting privileges.118 
An increase in accountability coupled with financial consequences 
could be enough to force Japan to change its tune.119 Pursuant to Article 
VIII of the ICRW, Japan is allowed to process and profit from whales killed 
for purposes of scientific research.120 A 2013 study conducted by the Inter-
national Fund for Animal Welfare, however, suggests “whaling is an eco-
nomic loser in the 21st century.”121 Looking at the industry’s heavy toll on 
Japanese taxpayers as well as the decrease in national consumption of 
whale meat, whaling’s commercial viability is in question.122 Because dis-
incentives—such as monetary sanctions, probationary periods, and loss of 
voting privileges—would make what appears to be a money-losing industry 
even less profitable, Japan would likely have no choice but to comply.123 
Because a remedy may be years away, the IWC’s diagnosis is clear: 
noncompliance and lack of accountability are serious impediments to its 
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legitimacy and overall effectiveness in providing “for the proper conserva-
tion of whale stocks” and making “possible the orderly development of the 
whaling industry.”124 Though a potential solution could take a number of 
forms, the key seems to be providing the IWC with more teeth.125 As Jordan 
notes, “Having a system to respond to non-compliance not only holds 
members to their obligations under the ICRW, but also enhances member 
confidence in the IWC.”126 
CONCLUSION 
The ICJ’s decision in Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening 
was a win for whale conservationists around the world. The ICJ put an end 
to JARPA II, a program regarded by many as a commercial whaling enter-
prise disguised as scientific research. The decision also outlined an objec-
tive process to determine whether a whaling program falls into the Article 
VIII exception of the ICRW. Even before the dust settled, however, Japan 
announced plans for NEWREP-A, a new special-permit whaling program 
set to launch in 2015. Despite the ICRW’s adoption of the ICJ’s standard of 
review and adverse findings of an IWC-commissioned expert panel as-
signed to review NEWREP-A, Japan has made it clear it will resume hunt-
ing whales in the coming season. Although the IWC’s implementation of 
the ICJ’s approach in Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening is one 
step in the right direction, more steps need to be taken to ensure the effec-
tive and efficient regulation of the taking of whales. Increasing the bite of 
the IWC—whether it be through amendments to the Schedule of the ICRW 
or the establishment of a procedural framework to deal with members’ non-
compliance—would better situate the IWC to achieve its stated purpose. 
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